// Defense

Explore Software Supply Chain Security

The dependency you never read is the one someone else is counting on.

Your package.json lists maybe a dozen packages. Your build actually pulls in hundreds — most of them dependencies of dependencies you've never opened, never audited, and would struggle to name. That gap between what you chose and what you're running is where this topic lives.

your tutor starts by sketching your dependency graph on the whiteboard — not the top-level list, the recursive one — so you can see where a minimal app quietly accumulates 47+ transitive packages before you've written a line of logic. From there you work through how that graph gets attacked: typosquatting, dependency confusion during resolution, a maintainer account gone rogue. Then the harder half — SBOMs, Sigstore/cosign signing, SLSA provenance — not as compliance paperwork but as the only way to answer 'where did this artifact actually come from.'

This isn't a replacement for your AppSec coursework or your CI/CD training. It's the place where you stop treating your pipeline as a build tool and start treating it as the production system it already is — one with secrets, network egress, and push access to prod.

// What a session feels like

You bring the questions. Your tutor asks the next one.

  • You tell your tutor your Express app has 'no dependencies to worry about — I only imported four packages.' It pulls up the whiteboard, expands the graph node by node until 47 transitive packages are sitting on the canvas, and asks you which of those four you'd still trust if you had to name every one of their maintainers.
  • In the terminal, your tutor has you run `npm audit` against a project and watches you conclude the scan came back clean, so you're covered. It then asks what CVE number a typosquatted package or a freshly poisoned update would carry — and lets you sit with the answer.
  • Working through the xz-utils timeline, your tutor lays out the two-year maintainer arc on the whiteboard — legitimate commits, earned trust, commit access, then the backdoor — and asks you to pinpoint the exact moment a code review could plausibly have caught it.

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